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Discussion of Guvenen and Kuruscu
by Francesco Caselli
Between 1970 and 2000 the wage structure in the US underwent signi￿cant
changes (several other countries experienced broadly similar patterns). Some
of the key facts are as follows.
￿ The college premium (the log-di⁄erence in average wages between col-
lege graduates and other workers) for younger cohorts of workers declined
in the 1970s, and then increased very steeply in the 1980s and 1990s.
￿ The college premium for older workers declined less (or not at all)
initially, and the subsequent rise was also less pronounced.
￿ Within wage inequality (the variance of the residual in a log-wage re-
gression controlling for education, experience, gender, etc.) increased
substantially throughout the period.
￿ Mean and median wages have stagnated (at least in the 1970s and
1980s)
On these four facts the evidence seems overwhelming and there is little
serious controversy that I know of. Some authors, including the authors of
the present paper, complete the list with a ￿fth, more controversial, fact:
￿ Available data show an increase in consumption inequality that is an
order of magnitude smaller than the increase in wage inequality.
The goal of this extremely ambitious paper is to provide a uni￿ed as
well as quantitative explanation for all ￿ve facts. It does so by developing a
theory of costly on-the-job learning, with heterogeneity in learning abilities,
in a dynamic environment where the rate of growth of the demand of learned
skills accelerates. This results in a most elegant and stimulating exercise that
also matches the quantitative features of the data quite well.
In this comment I begin by reviewing the mechanisms at work in the
model in greater detail. I then discuss informally the empirical plausibil-
ity of the proposed explanation, and conclude that the authors fail to make
the empirical case for the quantitative importance of their key mechanism,
namely costly on the job learning. I then compare the explanation in this
1paper to existing explanations in the literature. One super￿cial advantage
of the current paper is that it uses a (mostly) unique mechanism to ￿t all
￿ve facts above. In contrast, the existing literature takes a more piecemeal
approach, using di⁄erent stories for di⁄erent facts. Since the various bits and
pieces in the literature seem all rather plausible, however, and collectively
more plausible than the single one proposed here, I am not inclined to be un-
duly swayed in this case by appeals to Occam￿ s razor. This paper is, however,
more ambitious than most of the existing literature in that it sets a higher
bar for explaining the facts, as it seeks to provide a quantitative account.
Future work will have to respond to the challenge thrown by Guvenen and
Kuruscu.
1 Paper Overview
The paper is built on three key ingredients. The ￿rst is costly human-capital
accumulation throughout a worker￿ s lifetime, in the form of unpaid time spent
acquiring productive skills while formally on the job. Begin with a completely
stationary environment (i.e. no change in the rate of change of technology).
Then a typical worker￿ s lifetime wage pro￿le is upward sloping. The worker
spends the early part of his life using all of his productive time acquiring
human capital, i.e. in education. He then joins the labor force, but continues
to invest some of his time further building up human capital. The cost of
this time is the foregone earnings. Time investments in human capital decline
over time, as the retirement horizon approaches. Throughout the working
years the wage increases for two reasons. First, human capital becomes larger
and larger, which means that the worker earns more income for unit of time
spent working. Second, the fraction of time devoted to working (as opposed
to accumulating human capital) also increases over time.
The costly human-capital accumulation model has rich implications for
wage inequality. To show this, Guvenen and Kuruscu introduce a second
ingredient, heterogeneity in ability to learn marketable skills. Speci￿cally, the
addition to a worker￿ s skill capital per unit of time spent learning is higher
for some workers (called high ability) than for others (low ability). Hence,
high learning-ability workers will spend longer in school, and then will also
spend a larger fraction of their formal work time further accumulating skills.
They will therefore have greater educational achievement, higher wages on
average, and steeper life-time wage pro￿les. Figure 1 draws the implications
2of this for the relative wage pro￿les of college and high-school graduates in
the initial steady state, say circa 1965. Because of the steeper wage pro￿le
of college graduates the college premium is larger for older cohorts.
Figure 1 here
It is useful to note here the importance of the assumption that ability
only a⁄ects the production function for human-capital accumulation. If abil-
ity also a⁄ected productivity directly, high-ability individuals would have a
correspondingly higher opportunity cost of time, and their age-wage pro￿le
would be ￿ atter (and possibly they would achieve less schooling).1
The third key ingredient of the model is an increase in the rate of growth
of the market price of learned skills, or an increase in skilled biased techni-
cal change (SBTC), which is assumed to have occurred between 1970 and
2000. This change has two orders of e⁄ects on wages. First, there is a price
e⁄ect, which is simply the (exogenous) increase in the price of learned-skills.
The price e⁄ect tends to increase the relative wages of high-ability workers.
Second, there is an investment e⁄ect. Agents respond to the increased rate
of growth of the price for skills by spending more time accumulating skills.
Crucially, high-ability agents￿investments respond disproportionately, so the
investment e⁄ect reduces the relative wages of high-ability workers. In gen-
eral, therefore, the acceleration in SBTC has ambiguous e⁄ects on the wage
structure.
Most of the interesting action in the model comes out of this ambiguity,
and particularly from the fact that the relative strength of the price e⁄ect
and the investment e⁄ect vary over time, between ability groups, and between
age groups. Regarding the latter, notice that price e⁄ects tend to be larger
for older workers (who have accumulated larger stocks of skills), but the
investment e⁄ect is more relevant for younger workers (who will reap the
bene￿ts for a longer time span).
Consider the initial impact of the acceleration on the cross-sectional wage
pro￿le of college graduates. In Figure 2 the top solid line shows the initial
pro￿le (what we called the 1965 pro￿le) and the dashed line the pro￿le shortly
after the onset of faster SBTC - what one might see in 1975, say. Since the
shock is an increase in the rate of change of prices for skills, the price e⁄ect is
1High-ability workers already have a higher opportunity cost of time in the model as
it is, but the setup is such that the net e⁄ect always goes in the direction of making
high-ability workers invest more.
3positive, particularly for older workers who have a larger accumulated stock of
skills. But since prices have had very little time to increase, the e⁄ect is very
small. On the other hand, there is a potentially sizable negative investment
e⁄ect for younger workers, as they foresee considerably high future prices for
learned skills. Since the high prices are far in the future, on the other hand,
the investment e⁄ect will be very small for the old. As a result, the only
signi￿cant impulse on wages is the negative investment e⁄ect for younger
workers.
The qualitative e⁄ects on the wage pro￿le of high-school graduates, showed
by the two lower curves in Figure 2, is very similar. However, as discussed,
low-ability workers respond less to the higher future returns to skills because
their investments in accumulating knowledge are less productive. Hence, the
wage pro￿le for high-school graduates changes less. The net e⁄ect, as shown
in the Figure, is an initial decline in the college premium for younger workers
and very little change for older workers.
Figure 2 here
The subsequent rise in college premia is largely explained by the fact
that, eventually, the price e⁄ect seriously kicks in for all groups. In the
1980s, young college graduates continue to invest much more than young
high-school graduates, but in the meanwhile the price of human capital has
increased su¢ ciently that the net result is an increase in the college premium.
In the 1980s, the higher college premium for older workers re￿ ects both the
higher price of human capital and the increased on-the-job investment in
human capital by this generation in the 1970s. The subsequent increase for
both age groups is showed in Figure 3. This mechanism therefore explains
the ￿rst two facts of the initial list.
Figure 3 here
A potential di¢ culty in which this mechanism runs is that one of its
robust predictions seems to be that the cumulative growth of the college
premium should be larger for older workers than for younger workers (as is
implicit in Figure 3). Relative to the 1960s, at any subsequent point in time
the older should enjoy a larger price e⁄ect and a smaller investment e⁄ect.
This is indeed the case even in the main quantitative exercise of the paper:
between 1970 and 2000 the old college premium is predicted to rise 30 log
4points for the old and 25 for the young (Figure 7). In the same ￿gure, the
data show a 20 log-point increase for the young and 30 for the old. Given
that the interplay between price e⁄ect and investment e⁄ect are at the heart
of the paper I am not sure this point is entirely minor.
I now turn to the implications of unpaid learning time, heterogeneity,
and SBTC for within inequality. As far as I can tell the key to the success of
the paper in predicting a relatively smooth increase in within inequality over
time is that there are pervasive crossing of wage-age pro￿les within narrowly
de￿ned education groups. The crossings are due to the fact that higher-
ability agents (conditional on educational achievement) sacri￿ce more pay
early on in order to accumulate skills, so their take-home pay is less than
lower-ability agents with similar educational background. Later on relative
wages switch as the high-ability reap the bene￿ts of greater life-time skills.
The key e⁄ects of SBTC are still the price e⁄ect and the investment
e⁄ect, but with crossings the directions of these e⁄ects on inequality for the
young is reversed. In particular, for the young, the investment e⁄ect now
increases inequality, as the high-ability respond disproportionately, leading
to a further decline of their wages relative to the low-ability ones. The price
e⁄ect instead reduces inequality among the young. For the old, instead,
the investment e⁄ect reduces inequality, and the price e⁄ect increases it, as
was the case for the college premium. So if the investment and price e⁄ects
on inequality go in opposite directions for the young and the old, how can
inequality go up in all groups? Because the investment e⁄ect dominates for
the young (leading to more inequality) and the price e⁄ect dominates for the
old (also leading to more inequality)! This is all shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4 here
A slight complication on this discussion of within inequality is that cross-
ings, while pervasive, are not universal. There may be educational groups in
which the wage pro￿le of high ability agents is entirely above the wage pro￿le
of low-ability ones. This can happen because ability also a⁄ects the amount
of skills learned in school, so it is possible that in some educational groups
the high ability have such a disproportionate stock of knowledge that their
greater on-the-job investments are insu¢ cient to bring their earnings below
those of the lower-ability members of their age-education group. Applying the
now-familiar reasoning to these cases we should have that inequality within
the young of these groups should have declined in the 1970s, not increased.
5The model therefore suggests the following test: identify education groups
where the model predicts no crossings, and check that inequality within these
groups declines in the 1970s. It would be interesting to know the answer to
this question.
The last of the well-established empirical facts that the paper matches is
the stagnation of the median wage. This stagnation is due to three factors.
The ￿rst two are entirely within the economic logic of the paper￿ s central
argument. Namely, an increased (and increasing) fraction of time on the
job spent in unpaid learning - rather than producing; and a deterioration
of the average quality of the labor force at any point in time, as the most
talented spend more time in formal schooling. The third contributing factor
is a by-product of a technical assumption that is entirely outside the eco-
nomic argument of the paper (this is that agents are also endowed with a
stock of ￿raw labor,￿whose price has declined for exogenous reasons). It
was not entirely clear what was the relative contribution of the ￿economic
mechanisms,￿v. ad hoc assumptions in allowing the model to match the
facts on median wages.
2 How important is unpaid learning e⁄ort on
the job?
The most striking lacuna in the paper is that there is virtually no e⁄ort what-
soever to convince the reader that unpaid time spent learning while formally
on the job is a quantitatively important phenomenon, much less that it has
increased substantially since the 1960s, which is the crucial channel giving
rise to all the (interesting) wage e⁄ects in the model. It seems inconceivable
that if signi￿cant numbers of workers were engaged in this type of activity
the literature on labor relations would not have produced a description of
the phenomenon as well a number of case studies. Similarly, had there been
signi￿cant changes in the nature and use of time at work it is hard to imagine
that no anecdotal accounts would have surfaced in the popular press. The
authors￿case would have been much more persuasive had they been able
to point to at least some case studies/anecdotes. It is hard for me not to
interpret their apparent inability to do so as circumstantial evidence against
their contention.
In thinking about the plausibility of the story it is helpful to give more de-
6tailed consideration to what exactly the on-the-job investments in the model
may represent in the real world. At one end, we can give them a literal in-
terpretation. In the literal interpretation, workers spend a certain number of
each work-day, while at the workplace, reading books and manuals, experi-
menting with software, etc., rather than contributing (directly or indirectly)
to production. Their wages are curtailed proportionately to the fraction of
time spent learning.
Essentially, the literal interpretation amounts to a mismeasurement theory
of changes in the wage structure. For example, the college premium declines
in the 1970s because the decline in e⁄ective labor hours, which is much larger
for college graduates, is underestimated. Conversely, if time spent learning
was not (erroneously) reported in employer and employee surveys (e.g. the
CPS) as regular work time we would have observed no decline in the college
premium. Even setting aside the issue of the extent to which common sense
is compatible with an explanation of declining college premia primarily based
on greater time set aside by college graduates to learn new skills, one needs
to wonder why ￿rms and workers would misreport labor hours.
Potentially more promising seems to be the following lose interpretation.
In this interpretation all e⁄ort is productive, but while working workers learn
useful skills, most of which are portable (i.e. are worker speci￿c but not
employer- or job-speci￿c). Because workers are learning skills that will pay
o⁄in future employment, their current employers charge them for the implicit
teaching by paying them less than their marginal productivity in the current
job. Furthermore, since high-ability workers bene￿t more from this on-the-
job learning, they are also charged at a higher rate. It may then be possible
to obtain the result that with SBTC the ￿tax on wages￿charged by ￿rms
will increase disproportionately for young, high-ability workers. The lose
interpretation amounts therefore to a theory of changes in wage inequality
based on a (time varying) wedge between wages and marginal products.
Whether a model along these (somewhat more plausible) lines would be
able to quantitatively match the opening facts on the wage structure is of
course a moot question. Clearly some special feature would be required to
insure that the charge for learning survives competition among ￿rms.
73 This paper v the literature
The developments addressed in this paper are the focus of a very large lit-
erature, and many who have followed this literature feel that it has been
relatively successful at explaining the main facts. Most of this literature em-
phasizes the role of technical change. In this respect, Guvenen and Kuruscu
are entirely in line with widespread thinking. But they argue that the litera-
ture misses one of the fundamental mechanisms through which SBTC leads
to the wage facts. In this section I outline how the Guvenen and Kuruscu ex-
planation di⁄ers from received wisdom (which in the process, I re-evaluate).
3.1 College premium
The ￿majority view￿in the profession is that changes in college premia during
the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s result from the interaction of SBTC, which con-
tinuously increases the relative demand for skills learned in college, and the
relative supply of college graduates.2 Speci￿cally, the standard explanation
for the decline in the college premium in the 1970s is that in that decade
there was a large increase in the rate of increase in the relative supply of
college-educated workers, which then subsided in the 1980s and 1990s. This
pattern is actually reproduced in Figure 13 in the paper. The view is that
the fast increase in relative supply more than compensated for the increase
in relative demand leading to a temporary compression in the premium. In
the 80s and 90s the growth in the supply for college graduates slowed down,
which allowed the continued increase in relative demand for skills learned in
college to show up as a steep rise in the premium. As a result, the college
premium was higher by the end of this period.
Guvenen and Kuruscu propose a completely di⁄erent interpretation of
the 1970s. College graduates￿earnings fell because college graduates worked
less - as they shifted to more unpaid human-capital time investments while
employed. It then recovered, despite continued greater investments by college
graduates, due to the continued increase in the relative price per unit of
human capital actually supplied to the employer.
As to why the changes in the college premium (both down in the 1970s
and up in the subsequent decades) were more pronounced for younger work-
ers the ￿standard view￿adds a simple (though eminently plausible) twist.
2Whether explaining the facts requires an acceleration in SBTC, or simply that SBTC
continued at the same rates as before the 1970s is more contentious.
8Namely, young college graduates are imperfect substitutes for old college
graduates. By de￿nition, the increase in the relative supply of college grad-
uates in the 1970s must have been driven by the young, so the ￿supply glut￿
hypothesis is consistent with a decline in the ￿young college premium￿with
little change in the ￿old college premium￿ . I think this can explain also
the subsequent pattern in the 1980s and 1990s: the glut of young college
graduates of the 70s became a glut of middle-aged college graduates in the
subsequent period, preventing the relative wages of this group from raising
very much then. Meanwhile, the fall o⁄ in the relative supply of young col-
lege graduates allowed the relative wages of this group to soar in the 80s and
90s. The latter trend was almost certainly ampli￿ed by changes in college
curricula in the 1980s that made the skills of young college graduates even
more useful in the new technological environment.
In contrast to this (well-rehearsed) argument Guvenen and Kuruscu argue
that older college graduates in the 1970s did not respond by signi￿cantly in-
creasing human-capital investments, so their relative earnings did not decline
as much as those of young college graduates, who shifted into learning mode
much more aggressively.
In terms of ￿tting the college-premium facts, I already mentioned one
dimension where Guvenen and Kuruscu￿ s story falls somewhat short. By
the end of the SBTC episode, say by the year 2000, the overall increase in
the college premium relative to 1970 is counterfactually larger for the older
cohorts, both because the gap in human-capital between old college graduates
and high-school graduates has grown more than the equivalent gap for young
workers, and because the gap in human-capital investments has grown more
for young workers. The standard view, in contrast, should have no problem
matching a larger increase for the young.
3.2 Within inequality
In my reading of the literature, SBTC seems to command a signi￿cant ma-
jority of supporters (without admittedly even coming close to the status of a
consensus view) as an explanation for the behavior of the college premium ￿
especially when combined with the labor-supply patterns. The explanation
for the rise in within-group inequality is much more a matter of controversy,
and candidates that are not based on changes in technology enjoy greater
support. Nevertheless, SBTC is clearly a viable option, and I would venture
the guess that it would still command the support of a plurality, if not a
9majority, of labor and macroeconomists.
The fundamental SBTC explanation for increased within inequality is
simply that technical change has not only increased the relative demand
for skills learned in college, but also the relative demand for innate skills,
or ability (essentially, IQ). Since innate ability obviously varies widely even
within narrowly-de￿ned education and demographic groups, this naturally
leads to a rise in within-group inequality.
It is sometimes argued that the innate-skill mechanism is inconsistent
with the fact that the college premium declines in the 1970s, while within-
group inequality increased throughout the SBTC era. Clearly no such incon-
sistency exists. For SBTC to predict that within-group inequality and the
college premium move in lockstep it would have to be the case that innate
skills and skills learned in college are prefect substitutes. There is no rea-
son to believe this should be the case. Since the innate-skill distribution is
presumably roughly constant, when innate skills and learned skills are im-
perfect substitutes, the increase in the relative supply of college graduates
in the 1970s can depress the college premium without necessarily preventing
the ￿innate skill￿premium to rise.3
The Guvenen and Kuruscu story for the increase in within inequality is
very di⁄erent. It rests on the ￿crossing￿property of the wage pro￿les within
educational groups, together with disproportionate increases in time devoted
to learning by young people with high ability conditional on education (and
correspondingly large price e⁄ects for old people with high ability, always
3A simple example of a view of production and of SBTC that is consistent with the
patterns of the college premium and of within-group inequality is the following. Output is
given by Y = [(AhLh)￿+(AcLc)￿]1=￿, ￿ < 1. Lu and Ls are the ￿ ows of productive services
from high-school graduates and college graduates, assumed to be imperfect substitutes,
and de￿ned, respectively, as Lh =
R
a￿￿h(a)da and Lc =
R
a￿￿c(a)da, where a is innate
skill and the ￿s are the densities of innate skills among high-school and college graduates,
respectively. Assume for simplicity that the ￿s are uniform on [0;￿ ah] and [0;￿ ac], and
de￿ne Nh =
R ￿ ah
0 ￿h(a)da and Nc =
R ￿ ac
0 ￿c(a)da the masses of high-school and college
graduates, respectively. Suppose now that SBTC results in both an increase in the relative
producitivity of skills learned in college, i.e. an increase in Ac=Ah, and an increase in the
elasticity of output to innate skill, i.e. an increase in ￿. It is immediate to show that
within-wage inequality (i.e. the ratio of the wages of two workers with the same schooling
but di⁄erent a) does not depend on either Ac=Ah or Ns=Nh, but it will increase with
an increase in ￿. On the other hand the college premium, i.e. the average wage earned
by college graduates divided by the average wage of high-school graduates increases with
Ac=Ah and decreases with Ns=Nh (and is independent of ￿ if ￿ ac = ￿ ah: If ￿ ac > ￿ ah then the
college premium also increases in ￿).
10conditional on education). As mentioned above, however, there should be
educational groups where the crossing property fails, and in such groups we
should observe falling within inequality among the young in the 1970s. A
test along these lines would buttress the Guvenen and Kuruscu story against
the standard story, that predicts increased inequality within all groups.
3.3 Stagnation of the median and mean wage
The stagnation of median and mean wages through most of the last quarter
of the last century remains contentious. However, one popular explanation is
closely related to the previous theories of SBTC. This explanation emphasizes
the fact that the period in question has seen the advent of the information-
technology (IT). IT is a General Purpose Technology, and the arrivals of
such technologies are widely thought to entail transitional adjustment and
learning costs that show up as slow downs in TFP growth, labor productivity,
and average wages. A substantial literature models these e⁄ects.
In part, the Guvenen and Kuruscu exp0lanation is entirely in line with the
GPT view. One of the three contributing factors to the slowdown in wages is
the increase in time taken o⁄ from production by workers to get acquainted
with the technology. In this sense, the Guvenen and Kuruscu paper may
be interpreted as an attempt to model a particular case and quantify the
importance of the "adjustment to GPT" argument. As mentioned, however,
the relative importance of the learning cost e⁄ect on wages and other, more
ad hoc mechanism in the paper is not clear.
3.4 Consumption inequality
The potential ability of the model to explain why the rise in wage inequality
has seemingly not been matched by a similar increase in consumption in-
equality is perhaps the most important ￿victory￿of Guvenen and Kuruscu
over conventional accounts of SBTC. The latter, as far as I can tell, are un-
able to avoid predicting a signi￿cant rise in consumption inequality, because
they can￿ t help predicting an increase in the variance of permanent income.
The problem here is that a quick glance at the evidence that consump-
tion inequality did not rise is enough to destroy any con￿dence in this claim.
The most credible evidence that consumption inequality has increased con-
siderably less than income inequality comes from the Consumer Expenditure
11Survey (CEX). Heathcote, Perri, and Violante (2008), among others, doc-
ument a large and growing discrepancy between aggregate consumption as
inferred from CEX and in the national Accounts (see Figure 3 in their pa-
per). Clearly this points to a signi￿cant and increasing fraction of missing
consumption in the CEX. At a minimum, this should make us very cautious
in accepting quantitative assessments of the change in consumption inequal-
ity based on these data.
Even accepting that the increase in consumption inequality has not matched
the increase in wage inequality, we do not necessarily have to conclude that
the variance in permanent income has not changed. We now painfully know
that over the last few decades the ￿nancial sector has allocated credit based
on wildly unrealistic assumptions on the creditworthiness of lower-income
households. This has fuelled a consumption boom in the lower and middle
segments of the income distribution. Because the consumption increase was
excessive relative to the true increase in permanent income these households
are now beginning to default.4
4 College premia and labor supplies: another
look
5 Conclusions
The paper by Guvenen and Kuruscu is an ambitious, elegant, original, and
well-executed attempt to qualitatively and quantitatively explain a variety
of patterns in the wage and consumption data over a 30-year period, where
such data shows momentous changes. The main shortcoming of the paper
is that it does not even attempt to defend the empirical plausibility of its
main mechanism, much less establish it. In the absence of any evidence, even
merely anecdotal, that unpaid learning time at work is an important phe-
nomenon, and one that has undergone signi￿cant changes in recent decades,
one has to fall back on one￿ s priors on what is plausible. From this perspec-
tive, the view that changes in the wage structure are driven by changes in
the percentage of time formally spent at work for which the worker does not
get paid may appear somewhat far fetched.
4Incidentally, given the default option, the behavior of households needs not be irra-
tional. It￿ s the lenders that clearly miscalculated.
12In contrast, existing alternatives based on SBTC, imperfect substitutabil-
ity between di⁄erent groups of workers, and the inherent costs of adapting
to GPTs continue to appear both plausible and to have the potential to
adequately account for the facts quantitatively. Admittedly, however, there
have been few attempts of embedding them in a uni￿ed quantitative model.
Perhaps one fruitful way of reading the Guvenen and Kuruscu paper is as a





















Figure 4: SBTC and within inequality
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